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Abstract: We present empirical evidence on whether the introduction of the euro 
has changed the effect of economic fundamentals on the growth rates of euro 
countries’ GDPpc and GDPpc volatility. We find that there is a statistically sig-
nificant structural break in the impact of increments in government debt on both 
economic growth and uncertainty. In particular, after adoption of the euro incre-
ments in government debt decreased growth and increased uncertainty. These 
results are robust to a battery of checks, including exclusion of the recent finan-
cial crisis period, comparison with non-euro European countries, and controlling 
for different debt/GDP ratios.
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1  Introduction
It is now well known that the primary benefits of monetary union for the members 
are lower transaction costs and lower inflation. Yet, a currency union also has 
costs; asymmetric economic shocks and a lack of flexible adjustment mecha-
nisms can offset the economic benefits associated with a common currency [see 
Baldwin and Wyplosz (2006) and De Grauwe (1992) for an empirical investiga-
tion and Eichengreen (1991) for a survey of earlier works]. When members of a 
*Corresponding author: Jaime Luque, University of Wisconsin – Madison, 5259 Grainger Hall, 
975 University Ave., Madison, WI 53706, USA, e-mail: jluque@bus.wisc.edu
Abderrahim Taamouti: Carlos III University of Madrid and Durham University Business School, 
Mill Hill Lane, Durham DH1 3LB, UK
Brought to you by | University of Durham
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/31/14 11:33 AM
626      Jaime Luque and Abderrahim Taamouti
 currency union have heterogeneous preferences on monetary policy, consensus 
can be hard to achieve.1 As a consequence, there are likely impacts of economic 
fundamentals, such as government debt, on both economic growth and economic 
uncertainty when a country joins a currency union. Adoption of the euro by the 
first 12 euro zone countries, surely one of the most important events in the recent 
history of central banking and monetary policy, provides a natural laboratory for 
testing these questions.
Mundell’s (1961) seminal work initiated an important line of research on 
optimum currency unions. Alesina and Barro (2002), Barro and Tenreyro (2007), 
and Frankel and Rose (2002) studied the effect of the adoption of a common cur-
rency by a set of heterogeneous countries on certain macroeconomic variables, 
such as volume of trade, price stability, and output.2 We are not aware of any work 
that studies the specific question of whether adoption of the euro has changed 
the structural effect of fundamentals on economic growth and growth volatility. 
Our goal is to provide empirical evidence on this important question.
We consider the first 12 European countries that adopted the euro and conduct 
a cross-sectional empirical analysis between 1980 and 2011. We perform two main 
tests on the hypothesized change of the effect of economic fundamentals after 
adoption of the euro in 1999. The first test takes the per capita gross domestic 
product (GDPpc) growth rate as the dependent variable, while the second uses 
GDPpc growth rate volatility. The regression strategy in both tests follows two 
steps. We first recuperate the residuals from a panel regression of GDPpc growth 
rates on country and time fixed effects. A filtered growth rate would not reflect 
the growth rate from a country’s specific economic structure or for a specific year. 
In the second step, we take these residuals as a proxy of GDPpc growth rates, and 
the absolute value of the residuals as a proxy of GDPpc growth rate volatilities. In 
both tests we see whether each coefficient is different and statistically significant 
before and after introduction of the euro. If coefficients are different, we say that 
there has been a structural break in the effect of the particular variable.
We find that adoption of the euro introduces a statistically significant struc-
tural break in the coefficient that measures the effect of government borrowing 
on economic growth. Before adoption of the euro, increments in government debt 
had a positive effect on economic growth, while after adoption increments in debt 
1 See Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2010).
2 In particular, Alesina and Barro (2002) analyzed the trade-off between volume of trade and 
price stability in the formation of a currency union; Barro and Tenreyro (2007) investigated 
the impact of currency unions on bilateral trade and the extent of comovements of prices and 
outputs; and Frankel and Rose (2002) quantified the effect of common currencies on trade and 
output.
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reduced growth. Both effects are statistically significant, suggesting the existence 
of a structural break. We have performed some robustness checks, and found 
that the effect of the growth rate of government debt on economic growth is not 
driven by the financial and sovereign crisis period of 2008–2011 and that the set 
of European non-euro countries do not exhibit such a structural break in 1999. 
In addition, we have performed a similar regression but using robust standard 
errors (meaning that the estimators of the standard errors are robust to the heter-
oskedasticty and also to the cross-sectional dependence that characterizes panel 
data), and the result on a structural break is similar.
These results contribute to the recent literature on government debt and 
growth. Our paper contributes to the academic debate by focusing on the euro 
zone countries and controlling for the historical change of their monetary institu-
tions, country and time fixed effects, and other macroeconomic variables.
This literature has switched to examining whether the government debt may 
influence growth in a non-linear way; see Panizza and Presbitero (2013) for an 
excellent review of the literature, and the influential papers Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010) and Reinhart, Rogoff, and Svastano (2003) for a result where increments 
in government debt dampen economic growth to countries with high debt/GDPpc 
levels.3 Motivated by this debate, we pose the following question: Could it be pos-
sible that the structural break we see in the effect of government debt on growth 
is neither the result of the adoption of the euro, nor the matter of recent financial 
and sovereign crisis, but can be attributed to crossing the threshold level of debt 
above which the positive effect of debt on growth changes to negative? We have 
run several regressions that omit the observations that have a ratio of government 
debt to GDP above 50%, 70%, 90%, 110%, and 130%. For each of these thresh-
olds, we observe the existence of a statistically significant structural break on the 
effect of government debt growth on GDPpc growth.
In our analysis of the effect of fundamentals on economic uncertainty we 
find that there is a structural break in the effect of government debt growth on 
real GDPpc growth volatility. This break is statistically significant at 1% signifi-
cance level. Interestingly, this second main result is robust to exclusion of the 
recent financial and sovereign crisis (2008–2011 period). Furthermore, to test the 
results we repeat the empirical analysis for the European countries that did not 
adopt the euro. This test clearly indicates that this structural break is specific to 
the euro countries, and thus attributable to adoption of the euro. In addition, we 
checked whether the structural break is robust to using the square of the residu-
als as another proxy of volatility, and found that results do not qualitatively 
3 See also Afonso and Jalles (2013), Egert (2012), and Minea and Parent (2012).
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change. Finally, we have tested whether the statistically significance of the struc-
tural break vanishes when condition our regression to a given ratio of govern-
ment debt to GDP, and found that results do not change for thresholds 50%, 70%, 
90%, 110%, and 130%.
The main result of this paper is that the adoption of the euro changed the 
impact of government debt on both economic growth and uncertainty. The eco-
nomic intuition behind these effects can be summarized as follows. When the 
ability of a country to reduce the interests on its debt is reduced (or eliminated), 
new debt increments may weaken economic growth, particularly when new 
public investments produce at a rate lower than the debt’s real interest rate. More-
over, new debt may increase economic uncertainty since a country that loses the 
instrument of monetary policy also loses the ability to stabilize the effect of lever-
age in the economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a simple model specifi-
cation that identifies relevant economic fundamentals that affect economic 
growth and uncertainty. Section 3 presents the data used in the paper. Section 
4 presents the empirical analysis of the effect of fundamentals on economic 
growth. Section 5 presents the empirical analysis of the effect of fundamentals 
on economic uncertainty in a similar fashion. Section 6 concludes. The Appen-
dix further explains the robustness checks and presents the associated tables 
and figures. Our robustness checks can be enumerated as follows: (i) exclusion 
of the financial crisis period 2008–2011; (ii) considering as an additional control 
variable the real exchange rates; (iii) re-running the main regressions for the non-
euro European countries (control group), (iv) re-running the main regressions 
using estimators of the standard errors robust to the heteroskedasticity and also 
to the cross-sectional dependence that characterizes panel data, (v) re-running 
regression on economic uncertainty using instead the square of the residuals as 
a proxy for GDPpc growth rate’s volatility, (vi) re-running the main regressions 
conditional on a given ratio of government debt to GDP, (vii) Hausman endogene-
ity test for government debt, and (viii) “cusum” test to see the constancy of the 
coefficients of each individual Eurozone country.
2  Model specification
Our contribution in this paper is empirical. However, one would like to have a 
simple model specification that identifies relevant economic fundamentals that 
affect economic growth, as measured in terms of the growth rate of per capita 
gross domestic product. We consider a country 1 with a Cobb-Douglas produc-
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tion function where the final output is a function of the total factor productivity 
(A), the amount of labor employed (L), a nondurable intermediate input imported 
from another country 2 (M), and the amount of government expenditure (G). The 
economic intuition of input G is that there are productive government expendi-
tures, such as public infrastructure, education, and the health system, that also 
affect the final level of the final output.4 We omit transaction costs from the analy-
sis; for a study of the effect of transaction costs on trade in the euro zone, see 
Tenreyro and Silva (2010). The production function of a representative firm in 
country 1 in period t is:
 
1 2 1 21 .t t t t tY AG M L
α α α α− −
=  (1)
As is common in the growth literature, the variable Yt refers to country 1’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) at the end of period t, while the variables on the right-
hand side of equation (1) are dated as of the beginning of the period. All variables 
in (1) are expressed in aggregate real terms. We can write equation (1) in per capita 
(pc) terms by dividing both sides of the equation by country’s population. We 
will use lower case letters to denote the variables in per capita terms, and rewrite 
equation (1) as follows:
 
1 2 1 21 .t t t t ty A g m l
α α α α− −
=  (2)
We then loglinearize both sides of equation (2) and take the derivative with 
respect to time, and write:
 
1 2 3= ,t t t t t
t t t t t
y A g m l
y A g m l
α α α+ + +
  
 
(3)
where 1t t tx x x −−   denotes the variation with respect to time of a variable xt = yt, At, 
gt, mt, lt. We can express the per capita government expenditure gt as a function 
of new government gross debt bt, per capita government revenue from taxes τt, 
and per capita debt inherited from the previous period and associated interests 
rt≡(1+it)bt–1, where it denotes the interest rate at period t on previous government 
debt.5 The decomposition obeys the standard government budget constraint. The 
4 See Finn (1998) and Baxter and King (1993) for a similar approach of including G in a standard 
neoclassical production function.
5 In the literature, government debt is also referred to as “public debt,” see Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010). Note also that here, as in Barro’s (1979) theory, growth rate of debt is independent of the 
debt-income ratio.
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variation of government expenditure with respect to time can then be expressed 
as 3 4 5 .t t t tg b rα α τ α= + +    We can then write:
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 ,t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t
y A b r m l
y A g g g m l
τ
ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ= + + + + +
    
 
(4)
where ψ0 = 1, ψ1 = α1α3, ψ2 = α1α4, ψ3 = α1α5, ψ4 = α2, and ψ5 = α3. In steady state, GDPpc 
growth can be expressed as a function of growth rates of government borrowing, 
revenue, interest on debt, imports, and employment. The main equation that we 
use in our empirical analysis is the following:
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 .
y A b b r r m l
y A g b g g r m l
τ τ
ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ
τ
= + + + + +
    
 
(5)
Variables / ,b b  / ,τ τ  and /r r  are multiplied by their respective weight with 
respect to government expenditure. For instance, the weight of the growth rate of 
new government borrowing /b b  is b/g, measured as the percentage of new debt 
with respect to government expenditure.6
Equation (5) shows the effect of fundamentals in growth rates on the GDPpc 
growth rate. The total factor productivity component in our empirical analysis 
below corresponds to the intercept in the regression strategy. The second covari-
ate is the weighted growth rate of gross government debt, and, as we will see 
below, it is the variable that drives our main results. The remaining covariates are 
derived from the model and will be called “controls.” Omitting these “controls” 
may produce results exaggerating the effect on the growth rate of government 
borrowing.
We aim to provide the first empirical evidence on whether there has been 
a structural break in the coefficient of these important economic fundamentals 
after adoption of the euro. For this, we first rewrite the coefficient ψj of a variable 
j as follows:
for 1999,
for >1999.
j
j
j j
t
t
η
ψ
η λ
 ≤
=
+
We say that there was a structural break in the effect of gross debt growth on 
economic growth after 1999 if λ1≠0. Similarly, we can define a structural break for 
the remaining variables.
6 In our empirical analysis we obtain this ratio by dividing the percentage of gross debt with 
respect to GDP by the percentage of government expenditure with respect to GDP.
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In order to understand the effect of government debt on economic growth 
and uncertainty when a country gives up its own monetary policy, we draw here 
the lines of a simple two-period model. Consider a situation where government 
debt issued in the first period is used only for public investment (transfers to 
households are not considered), and in the second period there is uncertainty as 
to realization of the marginal productivity associated with levered government 
public investment. Also assume that debt monetization is ruled out and there are 
only two states in the second period. In one state the returns from investing the 
public levered funds (marginal productivity mpg) exceed the real interest rate on 
government borrowing (r), i.e., mpg > r. In the other state the opposite happens, 
mpg < r, i.e., the returns from the public levered investment are not enough to pay 
the interest on the debt.7
In this setting the country only has its nominal interest rate to try to revert the 
inequality mpg < r if a bad shock happens to occur. But once in a currency union, 
the country’s ability to manipulate the interest rate by intervening in the second-
ary bond market is greatly reduced (now the decision is in hands of a suprana-
tional central bank). Then, if the state mpg < r occurs, issuing new debt becomes a 
tax, hampering economic growth, and increasing the uncertainty about the prof-
itability of the country’s public levered investments.
3  Data
The data comes from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Data Outlook 
Databases. Real GDP is expressed in billions of national currency. Gross debt, 
government expenditures, and government revenue are expressed in current 
local currency as a percent of GDP.8 Imports is measured in percent change and 
employment in millions of persons. The data on 10-year interest rates on govern-
ment bonds come from Bloomberg Data Services.
To evaluate the robustness of our results, we will run an additional regres-
sion that includes the growth rate of the real effective exchange rate, defined as 
the nominal effective exchange rate (a measure of the value of a currency against 
7 This second state, although extreme, has been observed in some euro countries during the re-
cent financial crisis (e.g., Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal). We could have considered a less 
extreme state of nature, where the returns from the public levered investment are not enough to 
absorb a negative demand shock.
8 Net debt, which captures the difference between gross debt and financial assets held by the 
government, is hard to compute and rarely comparable across countries, see Panizza and Pres-
bitero (2014).
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a weighted average of several foreign currencies) divided by a price deflator or 
index of costs.9 The data on exchange rates comes from World Bank.
We obtained the real GDP in per capita terms by dividing the real GDP by the 
respective country’s population (population is measured in millions and is also 
obtained from the IMF’s website). Real per capita gross debt was obtained by 
multiplying the real per capita GDP by the percentage of gross debt with respect 
to GDP. In a similar way, we constructed the variables real per capita government 
expenditure and government revenue. Government expenditure is needed to con-
struct the weights in our regression (5). Interests were obtained by multiplying 
the 10 year government bond rate of year t by the real per capita gross debt of 
year t–1. Original data on imports comes in percent change terms, so to obtain 
the growth rate of per capita imports we subtract the population growth rate from 
the growth rate of (aggregate) imports. Employment is transformed in per capita 
terms by dividing it by the population of a country.
All economic variables are then transformed into growth rates, so causal 
effects must be interpreted in terms of growth rates of the variables. We run the 
regressions with a time lag of 1 year for the covariate. Using regressions with 
instantaneous effects (no time lag) would lead to an identification issue; that is, 
in that case we cannot identify whether fundamentals cause economic growth 
and uncertainty or whether economic growth and uncertainty cause fundamen-
tals to change.
IMF’s data is available at annual frequency. In our analysis the sample runs 
from 1980 to 2011. There are two reasons why we do not include years 2012 and 
2013. First, this time interval puts similar weights to both the pre-euro and the 
after-euro periods. Second, and more importantly, we found that after 2011 there 
are important problems of missing data for many variables, such us imports, 
debt, revenue, and expenditure.
We cover the first 12 euro zone members: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.10 
All these countries adopted the euro in 1999, except Greece in 2001. There are 
other countries that became members of the euro group later, namely Cyprus 
(2008), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014), Malta (2008), Slovakia (2009), and Slovenia 
(2007). We did not include these new members as they contribute to the panel 
with very few observations (our data goes until 2011 and in the robustness check 
of the financial crisis we omit the period 2008–2011).
9 See Edison and Melvin (1990) for a survey of early empirical papers that point out the impor-
tance of the effect of exchange rate variability on trade.
10 Andorra, Malta, Monaco, and San Marino are not included in the analysis.
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In a robustness check we consider a control group formed by those Euro-
pean countries that did not adopt the euro in the period under consideration. 
This group is composed by Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. There are other European countries that we 
chose not to include for different reasons. Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania were 
excluded due to their late structural economic reforms (evidence of this is the late 
accession to the European Union in 2007, 2013, and 2007, respectively), which 
suggests that these three countries cannot be thought as having similar economic 
characteristics as the treatment group (the euro countries). Latvia and Lithuania 
were excluded due to an important problem of missing data that goes until 1999.
The total number of both cross-sectional and time-series observations in 
our sample is 384 for the set of euro countries and 256 for the set of European 
non-euro countries. There are some missing observations for some countries, so 
in some tests the sample size is reduced. There is data on employment that is 
missing for Hungary and Poland, and there is data on government debt that is 
missing for Czech Republic and Hungary.
4  Effect of fundamentals on economic growth
We first describe the methodology we use to examine a possible structural break 
in the impact of fundamentals on economic growth caused by introduction of 
the euro. We are mainly interested in the effect of government debt. Following 
equation (5), the other variables used to explain the growth rate of real GDPpc 
are the growth rates of real per capita government revenue, real per capita inter-
est on borrowing, per capita imports, and per capita employment. Many of these 
additional control variables are important indicators that central banks use to 
determine the health of the economy when setting monetary policy.
4.1  Regression strategy
The regression strategy is based on two intuitive steps. We first estimate residu-
als from a panel regression of the GDPpc growth rate on country and time fixed-
effects. We then take the residuals as a proxy for GDPpc growth rates. The panel 
regression with country and time fixed effects allows us to filter out the GDPpc 
growth rate. Thus, the filtered growth rate will not reflect the growth rate of the 
underlying euro zone country’s specific economic structure and a specific year. 
The panel regression is:
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 ,it i t ity η δ υ= + +

 (6)
where 1
1
it it
it
it
y yy
y
−
−
−
≡  represents the level of GDPpc growth rate of country i at time 
t; yit is the country i real GDPpc at time t; ηi represents country i’s fixed effect; 
and δt represents the time t fixed effect. The permanent effect of the adoption of 
the euro should not be reflected by any specific euro zone country’s fixed effect 
or any specific year’s fixed effect. Roughly speaking, the residual υit captures an 
effect that can be attributed neither to the economic structure of country i nor to 
the economic events associated with a particular year t. Thereafter, we take as a 
proxy for the real GDPpc growth rate the fitted residual ˆ :itυ
 
ˆˆ ˆ ,it it i tyυ η δ= − −  (7)
where ˆ iη  and ˆtδ  are the statistically significant (at a 1% significance level or less) 
estimates of the country and time fixed-effects.
In the second step and to examine the effect of government debt and other 
fundamentals on the proxy for GDPpc growth rate before and after adoption of 
the euro, we run the panel regression:
 
1 1 1 , , , , , , 1
=2
ˆ ( ) ( ) ,
J
it i i t i t j j i t j i t i t
j
Debt X uυ µ φ ψ φ ψ
+ +
= + + + + +∑I I
 
(8)
where μi denotes the country-specific effect, Ii, t is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 if country i adopted the euro in year t or before, and a value of 0 other-
wise, and ui,t+1 denotes the idiosyncratic error term. The variable of interest to us 
is country i’s weighted growth rate of government debt at time t, here denoted by 
Debti,t. The growth rates of country i’s other potential economic fundamentals (or 
controls) at time t are denoted by Xj, i, t, for j = 2, …, J.
Our estimation procedure is a two-step procedure that may cause efficiency 
losses. However, notice that there is no guarantee that the implementation of 
one-step estimation procedure would lead to better results as the number of 
parameters to estimate would increase [estimating the parameters of the panel 
regressions (6) and (7) together] and this could cause some estimation bias.
It is worth noting that in the panel regression (8) the coefficients of the 
impact of government debt and of the other controls are different before and after 
adoption of the euro. Before the euro the coefficients are given by φj and after the 
adoption by φj+ψj, for j = 1, …, J. If an economic fundamental j has the same effect 
on the level of GDPpc growth rate before and after adoption of the euro, an equal-
ity must hold:
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,j j jφ φ ψ= +
and thus the coefficient ψj must be equal to zero.
For example, testing whether adoption of the euro has changed the effect 
of the growth rate of government debt on the level of the GDPpc growth rate is 
equivalent to testing the null hypothesis:
 0 1: 0,H ψ =  (9)
against the alternative:
 1 1: 0.H ψ ≠  (10)
The rejection of H0 against H1 will imply that there is a structural break in the 
impact of the growth rate of government debt on the level of the GDPpc growth 
rate due to introduction of the euro. Furthermore, comparison of the sign and the 
magnitude of the coefficients φj and φj+ψj will identify the direction of the changes 
and indicate whether the effect strengthens or weakens after adoption of the euro.
4.2  Results and discussion
We use the data to estimate the regression equation (8) and test the null hypoth-
esis (9) against the alternative hypothesis (10). The estimation results are summa-
rized in Table 1. As all economic variables are transformed in the same way (into 
growth rates) and are without units, the coefficients that measure the impact of 
fundamentals on GDPpc growth rate are comparable.
Table 1 reports a significant structural break in the effect of growth rate of 
government debt on economic growth after adoption of the euro. Increments in 
government debt have a positive effect on GDPpc growth rate before adoption, 
with a coefficient estimate of 35.48. The effect becomes negative after adoption 
with a large coefficient estimate equal to –26.90, meaning that an increase in gov-
ernment debt decreases GDPpc growth level. The last two columns indicate that 
the effects before and after adoption are statistically significant (at 5% and 1% 
significance levels, respectively), confirming a structural break in the effect of 
government debt growth on GDPpc growth.
4.2.1  Robustness checks
We have performed several robustness checks to test the validity of the results 
presented in Table 1. The following results are reported in Table 3 of the Appendix. 
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First, we have run a similar regression using robust standard errors (meaning that 
the estimators of the standard errors are robust to the heteroskedasticty and also 
to the cross-sectional dependence that characterizes panel data), and the result 
on the structural break of the effect of government debt on growth is similar; 
see the robustness check 1 column. We also found that the structural break is 
robust to exclusion of the financial and sovereign crisis period (2008–2011),11 see 
the robustness check 2 column, and to inclusion of real exchange rate as an addi-
tional control variable in the regression (8), see the robustness check 3 column.
Motivated by the recent literature on government debt and growth that exam-
ines whether government debt influences growth in a non-linear way (see Panizza 
and Presbitero 2013), we have run several regressions that omit the observations 
that have a ratio of government debt to GDP above a given threshold. The thresh-
olds we considered were 50%, 70%, 90%, 110%, and 130%. Results for each of 
these thresholds are presented in the robustness check 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 columns. 
For each of these thresholds, we observe the existence of a statistically significant 
Table 1 Estimation results of the impact of economic fundamentals on real per capita GDP 
growth level, 1980–2011.
GDPpc growth rate level   Coefficient   t-Statistic   Prob.
Gov. Debt   35.48**   2.05   0.040
Gov. Debt*Dummy   –62.38***   –3.02   0.002
Gov. Revenue   87.06**   2.04   0.042
Gov. Revenue*Dummy   –193.87***   –3.01   0.003
Interest on Borrowing   –26.27   –0.38   0.707
Interests on Borrowing*Dummy   49.76   0.65   0.515
Imports   -11.85**   –2.42   0.015
Imports*Dummy   9.51   1.52   0.129
Employment   28.43   0.4   0.690
Employment*Dummy   58.81   0.49   0.625
Const.   –6.73**   –2.01   0.045
R2 overall (%)   42.49    
This table reports estimation results of the impact of economic fundamentals on GDPpc growth 
rate level for the period 1980–2011. The results correspond to regression equation (8). The 
effect of economic fundamental j before adoption of the euro is measured by the coefficient 
φj, and after adoption by φj+ψj. For example, in this table the effect of government debt before 
adoption of the euro is 35.476, while its effect after the euro is 35.48–62.38 = –26.90. The total 
number of both cross-sectional and time-series observations in our sample is 384.  
***Significant at 1% and **significant at 5%.
11 We have also checked whether the results change when we drop the European sovereign debt 
crisis period (2009–2011), and found that results do not change.
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structural break on the effect of government debt growth on GDPpc growth level. 
These results suggest that the structural break we saw in the effect of government 
debt on growth is the result of the adoption of the euro and cannot be attributed 
to crossing the threshold level of debt above which the positive effect of debt on 
growth changes to negative.
4.2.2  Other fundamentals
Government revenue exerts a significant negative effect on economic growth 
after adoption of the euro. We see later that this significant effect of government 
revenue is robust to exclusion of the financial and sovereign crisis and to the 
inclusion of exchange rate as an additional control variable. However, when we 
run the same regression conditional on different thresholds of the ratios govern-
ment debt to GDP and government revenue to GDP, we found that the structural 
break becomes insignificant below thresholds 51% of government debt to GDP 
and 41% of government revenue on GDP; see the robustness checks 4 and 9 
columns of Table 3, respectively.
All other economic fundamentals exhibit no structural break in their impact 
on GDPpc growth. Imports appear to have a 13% statistically significant effect 
on economic growth both before and after adoption of the euro with coefficient 
estimates equal to –11.846 and –2.34, respectively. This result adds to Frankel and 
Rose’s (2002) prediction of a positive effect on trade of the adoption of a common 
currency. The small coefficient of –2.55 with low statistical significance supports 
evidence provided by Tenreyro and Silva (2010), who found only a small effect in 
trade after adoption of the euro.
4.2.3  Comparison with non-euro European countries
One might ask whether the structural break on the effect of government debt 
growth on GDPpc growth level reported in Table 1 is seen in the non-euro Euro-
pean countries. To investigate this question, we run regression (8) using data on 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the UK. The total number of both cross-sectional and time-series observations 
in this empirical analysis is 256. The estimation results for the period 1980–2011 
are reported in the robustness check 10 column of Table 3. We see that govern-
ment debt, government revenue, and interest on borrowing have no statistically 
significant effect on economic growth rate either before or after adoption of the 
euro. Imports and employment appear to have a statistically significant effect on 
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economic growth after adoption of the euro. Thus, comparison of the euro and 
non-euro European countries indicates that our result of the existence of a struc-
tural break on the effect of government debt growth on real GDPpc growth is spe-
cific to the euro zone countries, with the only exception of imports.
5  Effect of fundamentals on uncertainty
We now proceed to test the hypothesized change of the effect of economic funda-
mentals on GDPpc growth rate volatility after adoption of the euro.
5.1  Regression strategy
Our investigation of gross domestic product growth rate volatility (economic 
uncertainty) uses the same variables as those we use to investigate the level 
of the GDPpc growth rate. For GDPpc growth rate’s volatility we consider a 
linear approximation (first-order Taylor expansion) with the same economic 
fundamentals and the same data as before. The two-step regression strategy 
is also similar (Morgan, Rime, and Strathan (2004) follow a similar two-step 
regression procedure to investigate how integration of bank ownership across 
states has affected economic volatility within states). We first recuperate the 
residuals from a panel regression of GDPpc growth rate on country and time 
fixed effects.
Second, we take the absolute value of these residuals as a proxy of GDPpc 
growth rate volatility. The panel regression in step one allows us to filter out the 
GDPpc growth rate volatility from the underlying country’s specific economic 
structure and from a specific year fixed effect – the permanent effect of the adop-
tion of the euro should not be reflected by any specific year fixed effect. Formally, 
we run the panel regression (6). Thereafter, we take as a proxy of real GDPpc 
growth rate’s volatility the absolute value of the residual υit:
 
 ˆˆ ˆ( ) | | | |,it it it it i tVol g gυ η δ= − −  
(11)
where ˆ itυ  is the fitted residual, and ˆ iη  and ˆtδ  are the statistically significant (at 
a 1% significance level or less) estimates of the country and time fixed effects, 
respectively. We have also considered another measure of GDPpc growth rate’s 
volatility given by the square of the residuals,  2 2ˆˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ,it it it it i tVol g gυ η δ= − −  and 
results are similar (see discussion in the next subsection).
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In the second step and to examine the effect of government debt and other 
fundamentals on GDPpc growth rate’s volatility before and after adoption of the 
euro, we run the panel regression:
 
1 1 1 , , , , , , 1
2
ˆ| | ( ) ( ) ,
J
it i i t i t j j i t j i t i t
j
Debt Xυ ω β γ β γ ε
+ +
=
= + + + + +∑I I
 
(12)
where ωi is the country-specific effect; Ii, t is a dummy variable that takes a value 
of 1 if country i adopted the euro in year t, and a value of 0 otherwise; Debti, t is 
country i’s weighted growth rate of government debt at time t; Xj, i, t, for j = 2, …, J, 
are growth rates of other potential economic fundamentals in country i at time t; 
and εi, t+1 denotes the idiosyncratic error term.
The coefficients of the impact of government debt and of other controls on 
GDPpc growth rate’s volatility before and after adoption of the euro are given by 
βj and βj+γj, for j = 1, …, J, respectively. If an economic fundamental j has the same 
effect on GDPpc growth rate’s volatility before and after adoption, the equality 
must hold:
,j j jβ β γ= +
and thus the coefficient γj must be equal to zero. For example, testing whether the 
adoption of the euro has changed the effect of debt on the GDPpc growth rate’s 
volatility is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis:
0 1: 0,H γ =
against the alternative
1 1: 0.H γ ≠
The rejection of H0 against H1 will imply there has been a structural break in the 
impact of government debt growth rate on GDPpc growth rate’s volatility attrib-
utable to introduction of the euro. Comparison of the sign and the magnitude of 
the coefficients βj and βj+γj will identify the direction of the changes and indicate 
whether the effect strengthens or weakens after introduction of the euro.
5.2  Results and discussion
After filtering gross domestic product growth rate’s volatility using equations 
(6) and (11), we run regression (12) with all the economic fundamentals. The 
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 estimation results are summarized in Table 2. Since all economic variables are 
transformed in the same way (into growth rates) and are without units, the 
estimated coefficients that measure the impact of the fundamentals on GDPpc 
growth rate’s volatility are comparable.
Table 2 reports a significant structural break in the effect of the growth rate 
of government debt on economic uncertainty after adoption of the euro. Incre-
ments in government debt have a negative effect on GDPpc growth rate volatility 
before adoption, with a coefficient estimate of –22.241. The effect becomes posi-
tive after adoption with a large coefficient estimate equal to 35.508, meaning that 
an increase in government debt increases GDPpc growth rate’s volatility. The last 
two columns indicate that the effect after adoption is statistically very significant, 
confirming a structural break in the effect of government debt.
5.2.1  Robustness checks
We have performed several robustness checks to test the validity of the results pre-
sented in Table 2. The following results are reported in Table 4 of the Appendix. 
Table 2 Estimation results of impact of economic fundamentals on GDP growth rate volatility, 
1980–2011.
GDPpc growth rate volatility   Coefficient   t-Statistic   Prob.
Gov. Debt   –22.24   –1.51   0.131
Gov. Debt*Dummy   57.75***   3.34   0.001
Gov. Revenue   –49.98   –1.37   0.172
Gov. Revenue*Dummy   122.77**   2.25   0.024
Interest on Borrowing   –10.11   –0.17   0.864
Interests on Borrowing*Dummy  –2.97   –0.05   0.963
Imports   –0.59   –0.14   0.891
Imports*Dummy   –0.49   –0.09   0.927
Employment   –37.19   –0.6   0.547
Employment*Dummy   11.02   0.11   0.916
Const.   29.78***   17.18   0.000
R2 overall (%)   25.03    
This table reports estimation results of the impact of economic fundamentals on GDPpc growth 
rate volatility. The dependent variable (proxy of GDPpc growth rate volatility) is given by the 
absolute value of the residual υit in (6). The results correspond to regression equation (12). The 
effect of economic fundamental j before adoption of the euro is measured by the coefficient 
βj, and after adoption by βj+γj. For example, in this table the effect of government debt before 
adoption of the euro is –22.241, while its effect after adoption is –22.241+57.749 = 35.508. The 
total number of both cross-sectional and time-series observations in our sample is 384.  
***Significant at 1% and **significant at 5%.
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First, similar results can be obtained if we take the square of the residuals as a 
proxy of GDPpc growth rate’s volatility, see the robustness check 11 column. We 
have also performed a similar regression using robust standard errors (meaning 
that the estimators of the standard errors are robust to the heteroskedasticty and 
also to the cross-sectional dependence that characterizes panel data), and the 
result is similar; see the robustness check 12 column. Also, this result is robust 
to exclusion of the financial and sovereign crisis, see the robustness check 13 
column, and to inclusion of real exchange rate as an additional control variable 
in the regression (12), see the robustness check 14 column.
In addition, we have run the regression conditional on a ratio gov.debt/GDP 
below a given threshold. As in the case of economic growth, the thresholds we 
considered were 50%, 70%, 90%, 110%, and 130%. For each of these thresholds, 
we observe the existence of a statistically significant structural break on the effect 
of government debt growth on GDPpc growth rate’s volatility, see the robustness 
check 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 columns in Table 4, respectively. These additional tests 
suggests that the structural break observed on the effect of government debt on 
uncertainty cannot be attributed to crossing a particular threshold level of gov-
ernment debt to GDP.
5.2.2  Other fundamentals
All other economic fundamentals, except government revenue, exhibit no struc-
tural break in their impact on GDPpc growth rate’s volatility. The structural break 
in the impact of government revenue on uncertainty is not robust to control-
ling for real exchange rate, see the robustness check 14 column in Table 4. We 
also checked whether this structural break is robust to different thresholds for 
the ratio of government debt to GDP, and found that it becomes insignificant for 
ratios below 51%, see the robustness check 15 column in Table 4. This additional 
evidence suggests that the effect of government revenue on uncertainty can be 
due to crossing a specific threshold level of gov.debt/GDP, and not to adoption of 
the euro.
5.2.3  Comparison with non-euro European countries
We again investigate whether these results can also be seen in the non-euro 
European countries. We run regression (12) using data on the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. As before, 
the total number of both cross-sectional and time-series observations is 256. 
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The estimation results for the period 1980–2011 are presented in the robustness 
check 20 column of Table 4. Comparison of euro and non-euro European coun-
tries indicates that the result of a structural break in the effect of government debt 
on economic uncertainty is particular to the euro zone countries.
6  Conclusions
The recent European debt crisis sparked a debate on the benefits and costs 
associated with the European Monetary Union. We contribute to this literature 
by providing first evidence on the effects of several economic fundamentals 
on economic growth and uncertainty with adoption of the European single 
currency. Government debt appears to be the primary variable that exhibits a 
structural break on both economic growth and uncertainty. The statistical sig-
nificance of this break is robust to several checks, including exclusion of the 
financial and sovereign crisis period and comparison with other non-euro Euro-
pean countries.
Our empirical results strongly suggest that future research should consider 
the idea of creating new permanent institutions that might offset the negative 
structural changes induced by the adoption of a common currency. De Grauwe 
(2011) contributes to this debate by arguing that the recent government debt crisis 
in the Eurozone is due to a failure of economic governance. Luque, Morelli, and 
Tavares (2014) exploit a theoretical model that explains how an increase in GDPpc 
volatility in a monetary union brings salience to the extreme options of moving 
towards a fiscal union versus reverting to autarky. Roughly speaking, without 
further institutions like a fiscal union, the adoption of the euro by some European 
countries stands as a big obstacle for the survival of the union as a whole.
Finally, recognize that we take a neutral position in the debate on adoption 
of the euro, trying not to be swayed by popular arguments in favor of or against 
the euro. Our only purpose has been to provide the first empirical evidence on 
the effects of fundamentals on economic growth and uncertainty surrounding its 
adoption.
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Appendix
Robustness checks and tables
To support the main findings in Tables 1 and 2, we conduct several robustness 
checks:
1. We exclude the financial crisis by focusing on the period 1980–2007.
2. We consider as an additional control variable the real exchange rate defined 
as the nominal effective exchange rate (a measure of the value of a currency 
against a weighted average of several foreign currencies) divided by a price 
deflator or index of costs.
3. We re-run the main regressions (8) and (12) using instead non-euro European 
countries: Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the UK. This exercise helps us see whether the results in 
Tables 1 and 2 characterize simply the countries of the euro area.
4. We re-run the main regressions (8) and (12) using instead robust standard 
errors (meaning that the estimators of the standard errors are robust to the 
heteroskedasticity and also to the cross-sectional dependence that character-
izes panel data).
5. We re-run the regression (12) using instead the square of the residuals as a 
proxy for GDPpc growth rate’s volatility.
6. We re-run the main regressions (8) and (12) conditional on a given ratio of 
government debt to GDP.
7. Hausman test to test for endogeneity of government debt: We use the Hausman 
test to check whether government debt growth is endogenously determined 
with GDPpc growth. If endogeneity is present, then OLS estimates will be 
biased and inconsistent. To test this hypothesis, we use the growth rate of 
real exchange rate as the instrumental variable. As it is well known in the lit-
erature, it is difficult to find a good instrument for this type of regression [see 
Panizza and Presbitero (2012)]. The real exchange rate is usually argued to be 
a satisfactory instrumental variable due to its correlation with government 
debt through its foreign debt component (in the auxiliary regression govern-
ment debt appears to be positively correlated to the real exchange rate at a 1% 
statistically significance level). To run the Hausman test we compare two sets 
of estimates, one that is consistent under both the null and the alternative 
and another that is consistent only under the null hypothesis. A large differ-
ence between the two sets of estimates is taken as evidence in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis. Our analysis confirms that government debt growth 
Brought to you by | University of Durham
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/31/14 11:33 AM
644      Jaime Luque and Abderrahim Taamouti
is not an endogenous variable. Results are reported in Table 5. We refer to the 
note of Table 5 for the details of this test.
8. Cusum test for the constancy of the coefficients: To test the validity of our 
structural break results, we use the “cusum” test introduced by Brown, 
Durbin, and Evans (1975). Using recursive residuals, this test allows a point 
by point analysis, enabling us to see both the abrupt and gradual changes 
and also the approximate sample periods in which the changes occur. We 
take here a standard approach and apply the cusum test to each individual 
country. We find that there is a break in the year of adoption of the euro for 
the majority of countries.
The output of the cusum test is a graph. The interpretation is the following. There 
is no break when the cusum line is close to the horizontal axis (at zero level of the 
vertical axis). A departure from the horizontal axis indicates that there is a break 
at the point of departure.
Cusum test
We were not able to apply the cusum test to Luxemburg and the Netherlands 
due to missing data problems. In particular, for these two countries there are no 
data between 1980 and 1996 for variables such as government debt, government 
revenue, and interests. For the rest of the Eurozone countries, the problem of 
missing data is less important and the cusum test can be performed.
The cusum tests for the residuals (proxy of GDPpc growth rate) of each Euro-
zone country (except Luxemburg and the Netherlands) are presented in Figures 
1–10. This test is done in the context of regression (8). The cusum tests for the 
absolute value of the residuals (proxy of volatility of GDPpc growth rate) of each 
eurozone country (except Luxemburg and the Netherlands) are presented in 
Figures 11–20. This test is done in the context of regression (12).
These figures show that there is a departure of the cusum line from the hori-
zontal axis for the majority of these countries in a small neighborhood of year 
1999, except for Greece whose departure is around 2001 (the year when Greece 
joined the euro).
Our main results of existence of structural breaks in the effect of government 
debt on both economic growth and uncertainty after introduction of the euro are 
consistent in all robustness checks.
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Al
l r
es
ul
ts
 in
 Ta
bl
e 3
 co
rre
sp
on
d 
to
 re
gr
es
si
on
 eq
ua
tio
n 
(8
). 
As
 in
 Ta
bl
e 1
 th
e e
ffe
ct
 o
f e
co
no
m
ic 
fu
nd
am
en
ta
l j
 b
ef
or
e a
do
pt
io
n 
of
 th
e e
ur
o 
is
 m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 th
e c
oe
ffi
cie
nt
 φ
j, a
nd
 a
fte
r a
do
pt
io
n 
by
 φ
j+ψ
j. T
he
 la
st
 ro
w 
of
 th
e t
ab
le
 co
rre
sp
on
ds
 to
 th
e t
ot
al
 n
um
be
r o
f b
ot
h 
cr
os
s-
se
ct
io
na
l a
nd
 ti
m
e-
se
rie
s 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
 in
 ea
ch
 sa
m
pl
e.
 B
el
ow
 ea
ch
 co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 w
e w
rit
e t
he
 p
-v
al
ue
 in
 b
ra
ck
et
s.
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ta
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tic
al
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e l
ev
el
s a
re
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s f
ol
lo
ws
: *
**
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
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t 
1%
, *
*s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 5
%
, a
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 *s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t 1
%
. T
ab
le
 3
 re
po
rts
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e f
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wi
ng
 ro
bu
st
ne
ss
 ch
ec
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r t
he
 im
pa
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f e
co
no
m
ic 
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nd
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en
ta
ls
 o
n 
GD
Pp
c 
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ow
th
 ra
te
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la
til
ity
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m
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wt
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e p
er
io
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19
80
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n 
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an
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rd
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ro
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st
 to
 th
e h
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er
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ke
da
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ici
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 a
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 th
e c
ro
ss
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ec
tio
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l d
ep
en
de
nc
e t
ha
t c
ha
ra
ct
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ize
s p
an
el
 d
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 p
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e f
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In
 co
lu
m
ns
 2
–1
0 
of
 Ta
bl
e 4
 th
e d
ep
en
de
nt
 va
ria
bl
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pr
ox
y o
f G
DP
pc
 g
ro
wt
h 
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te
 vo
la
til
ity
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 th
e a
bs
ol
ut
e v
al
ue
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f t
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 re
si
du
al
. I
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m
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1 t
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de
pe
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en
t v
ar
ia
bl
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pr
ox
y o
f G
DP
pc
 g
ro
wt
h 
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te
 vo
la
til
ity
) i
s g
ive
n 
by
 th
e s
qu
ar
e o
f t
he
 re
si
du
al
. T
he
 re
su
lts
 co
rre
sp
on
d 
to
 re
gr
es
si
on
 eq
ua
tio
n 
(12
). 
As
 in
 Ta
bl
e 2
, t
he
 ef
fe
ct
 o
f e
co
no
m
ic 
fu
nd
am
en
ta
l j
 b
ef
or
e a
do
pt
io
n 
of
 th
e e
ur
o 
is
 m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 th
e c
oe
ffi
cie
nt
 β j
; a
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 a
fte
r a
do
pt
io
n 
by
 β j
+γ
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he
 la
st
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of
 th
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ab
le
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 to
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ot
al
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r o
f b
ot
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cr
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ct
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nd
 ti
m
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se
rie
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er
va
tio
ns
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 ea
ch
 sa
m
pl
e.
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el
ow
 ea
ch
 co
ef
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ie
nt
 w
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rit
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th
e p
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ue
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 b
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ck
et
s.
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al
 si
gn
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ev
el
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re
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s f
ol
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ws
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si
gn
ifi
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 a
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%
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ig
ni
fic
an
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an
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Table 5 Hausman endogeneity test.
GDPpc growth   Coefficient   t-Statistic   Prob.
Gov. Debt Growth   51.20   0.54   0.592
Gov. Revenue   267.21   2.98   0.003
Interest on Borrowing   –230.87   –1.78   0.077
Imports   6.50   0.84   0.403
Employment   –14.48   –0.08   0.939
Residual_debt   –57.47   –0.59   0.557
Const.   –19.20   –2.32   0.021
R2 overall (%)   7.49    
Note: We use the Davidson and MacKinnon’s (1989) version of the Hausman test by running an 
auxiliary regression. For this, we have to run two OLS regressions. In a first regression (the aux-
iliary regression), we regress the suspect variable (government debt growth) on all exogenous 
variables and instruments and retrieve the residuals (this regression shows that government 
debt and the real exchange rate are positively correlated at 1% statistically significance level). 
We then use these retrieved residuals as additional regressors in a second regression that re-
estimates the GDPpc growth rate function. Results are reported in Table 5. If the OLS estimates 
are consistent, then the coefficient on the first stage residuals should not be significantly dif-
ferent from zero. In Table 5 we can see that the test does not reject the hypothesis of consistent 
OLS estimates at conventional levels (t-statistic  = –0.59). Thus, we conclude that government 
debt growth is not an endogenous variable. There are 264 total panel observations. Variable 
“Residual_debt” stands for the retrieved residuals from the auxiliary regression.
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Figure 1 Austria.
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Figure 3 Finland.
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Figure 2 Belgium.
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Figure 4 France.
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
CUSUM
5% Significance
Figure 5 Germany.
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Figure 6 Greece.
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Figure 7 Ireland.
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Figure 8 Italy.
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Figure 9 Portugal.
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Figure 10 Spain.
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Figure 11 Austria.
Cusum test for economic uncertainty
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Figure 13 Finland.
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Figure 12 Belgium.
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Figure 15 Germany.
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Figure 14 France.
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Figure 16 Greece.
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Figure 19 Portugal.
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Figure 20 Spain.
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